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larity from Truman through Johnson is the most compelling work on the subject to date.1 Since the findings presented here dispute those of Mueller, it is important to examine his analysis in some detail. Mueller relies heavily on time as his chief explanatory variable which requires that he identify some theoretically meaningful variable which time represents. He borrows a theme from Downs and argues that the president frequently loses public support even when his policy follows the preferences of the majority of the citizenry because the minority feels more intensely about the issue.2 If one assumes that, as a president makes decisions he alienates more citizens than he pleases, it follows that the longer the president is in office, the less popular he becomes. Following Downs, Mueller calls this the "coalition-of-minorities" effect. If the president runs for a second term, he rebuilds his electoral coalition and the downward drift begins all over again. Time, Mueller argues, reflects presidential decision making, and the secular decline of approval reflects the accumulation of presidential decisions. The plausibility of this explanation is enhanced by the one president who successfully maintained his popularity. It may not be coincidental that among recent presidents Eisenhower championed the fewest causes or policies.3
Having suggested a theoretical underpinning for time, Mueller employs it to the fullest in explaining monthly variations in popularity. Each president's popularity is allowed to start at a different level and to decline at its own rate. This considerably improves the explanatory power of time. Next he permits different trends for each term of the two-term presidents Table 2. and arrives at the equation presented in Table  1 . If one defines and tailors the "coalition-ofminorities" variable in this way, any trend in the president's popularity will be measured by time which, not surprisingly, now explains nearly 80 percent of the variance in popularity. But what has been explained? All we have in the end is a set of straight lines measuring the separate trends for each term. Does the steep decline in President Johnson's popularity during his second term (b = -8.13) mean simply that he was making more decisions than the other presidents, or does it reflect the special effect of the Vietnam War? Since whatever trend is present in the president's public standing is obviously captured by time, there is little variance left to be explained by more substantive variables. In Johnson's case, for instance, after controlling for the downward trend, Mueller declares that "the Vietnam War had no independent impact on President Johnson's popularity at all."4 Of the various substantive short-run forces that should have a continuing effect on popularity, Mueller found only the Korean War during Truman's administration and increasing unemployment during Eisenhower's tenure correlated with the president's popularity. Hibbs reanalyzed these data, correcting for serial correlation in Mueller's estimates, and dismissed even these substantive relationships as unimportant.5 James Stimson has recently reexamined time, and although it remains the primary determinant of presidential popularity, its functional form is different, and a wholly different explanation for the relationship is proposed. While Mueller reports a linear relationship for time, Stimson finds that a quadratic relationship fits better for each term of every president except Kennedy.6 For a while presidents become less popular in a near-linear fashion, but eventually the decline bottoms out and their popularity may even improve although not to its former high level. Stimson suggests that Kennedy's popularity, for which a linear trend works better, was about to level off at the time of his assassination.
To explain this relationship Stimson discards Mueller's political explanation and relies instead on a psychological model of public opinion. He identifies persons who are "less partisan, less knowledgeable, and less involved in politics" as the segment of the public which should be most "fickle" in its support of a president.7 They initially hold a "naive admiration" for the new president because of his campaign promises and the uncritical media treatment during the honeymoon period. The "unrealistic expectations are followed by an inexorable disillusionment," and thus the president's popularity declines. The great difference between Mueller's and Stimson's explanations reveals the slippery nature of time. Time as a variable has no inherent theoretical meaning; time can be used to confirm any theory's validity which predicts that a president's popularity will tend to decline from its initial high level. If the "coalition-of-minorities" and "expectation-disillusionment-forgiveness" theories are to be persuasive, more compelling evidence is needed. The "coalition-of-minorities" could be more substantively measured by an index of the number and type of specific presidential policies. Another strategy might be to find different "minorities" dropping out on different occasions. Did President Kennedy lose the support of the business community, for example, during the steel price crisis in 1962? Stimson's thesis rests primarily on the behavior of an identifiable group. Finding change in approval in the predicted direction more pronounced for citi- A variable of such theoretical importance deserves more careful consideration. Three monthly economic indices have been tested. In addition to the unemployment rate, I examined the monthly consumer price index and total personal income. This last variable is similar to the one successfully employed by Kramer, Tufte, and Bloom and Price in their separate research into the economic determinants of congressional voting.20 Largely duplicating the effects of unemployment and inflation, total personal income performs weakly under statistical controls and therefore will be dropped from subsequent analysis.
The underlying variable which these "hard" economic indicators represent is the public's perception of the economy. Mueller persuasively argues that public perceptions of how the economy is changing is more important in evaluating the president's performance than is the absolute level of the unemployment rate or consumer price index. A six-percent unemployment rate may benefit an incumbent president if it had been hovering around a much higher figure or tarnish his prestige if it represents a significant rise. If we accept that change in these monthly indices more closely parallels the public's evaluative process, the central issue becomes one of discovering the appropriate time intervals for measuring this change. Mueller prefers to use the unemployment rate at the beginning of the president's term as the benchmark for public evaluations. While this base has the attractive quality of being the first point of the president's responsibility, such a comparison requires that the public be able to recall what the unemployment (or inflation) rate was as long as four years ago. Perhaps his failure to find meaningful relationships between unemployment and popularity reflects this feature of the operational definition. The public more likely evaluates the relative change in the economy over a much briefer interval.
To find a more proximate benchmark for economic evaluations, I have tested several different moving average comparisons.21 Unemployment and consumer prices generally correlated better with popularity when change was measured over a six-month period than for other time spans. To test their validity on an external criterion I correlated these indices with the public's perceptions of the economy. The national Harris survey taken during a three-year period from 1971 until early 1974 asked respondents if they thought the U.S. was in a recession and whether prices were rising more or less rapidly than a year ago. In Table 2 we see that six-month changes in unemployment and consumer prices are closely correlated with perceptions of the current economic conditions. a"Do you feel that prices of most things you buy are rising more rapidly than a year ago, about as rapidly as they were then, less rapidly than a year ago, or are they going down?" Scored percent saying "more rapidly." b"Do you feel the country is in a recession today or not?"
Responses to these questions were obtained from monthly publications of Current Opinion in 1973 and January, 1974.
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When unemployment is measured by percent change over the last six months rather than simply its current rate, it generally behaves better in its zero-order relationship with popularity. The improvement is not uniform, however. In Table 3 the signs of the transformed rate run in the wrong direction for the Truman and Nixon ratings. Under adequate statistical controls, the strong positive correlation of change in unemployment with Truman's popularity is eliminated.22 Even for Kennedy the bivariate correlations fail to reveal the full impact of this transformation on the relationship. In the regression equations to be examined later, percent change in unemployment emerges as an important correlate of Kennedy's popularity. Transforming unemployment has the most dramatic effect on Johnson's popularity where the correlation shifts from strongly positive to negative.
The consumer price index is also measured in percent change since each month's index will be (almost by definition) some increment larger than the one for the previous month. Change in the consumer prices appears in the table to be a primary candidate for explaining each president's popularity.23 During the 1950s and early 1960s the U.S. enjoyed an annual inflation rate of near 2 percent. As inflation has grown at a faster pace over the last ten years, so too has its apparent influence on the public prestige of presidents according to the large correlations for Johnson and Nixon. 22This occurs when controlling for Korean War casualties, Early Term effect, and Rally, all of which are examined below. In the final regression equations in Table 5 an extended period. Rally events, on the other hand, should produce immediate bursts of support but of short duration. Explaining the significant bumps on the popularity trend should not only improve the overall explanatory power of our equations but also enhance the influence of those variables which are durable contributors to popularity.
Mueller developed a useful list of rally events which were international in origin, directly involved the United States, and were "specific, dramatic, and sharply focused."26 He also included presidential inaugurations among the rally events for "analytic convenience." As we shall see the inclusion of what he recognized to be "arbitrarily designated" rally points has a dramatic effect on the explanatory power of this variable.27 In order to ascertain the contemporary public salience of these events, I performed a systematic content analysis of the front pages of three metropolitan newspapers for the week in which each event received maximum coverage. Almost all of the events made the front page for at least five consecutive days, which would seem to be sufficient exposure to guarantee widespread public awareness.2 8
Mueller estimated the effects of these events for each month's approval rating as the length of time since the last rally point. By this method a high score for a given month means that there has been no recent event. While every observation after the first rally event is given some value, this still leaves the problem of what values to assign those periods before the first event occurs. Mueller found it necessary to begin each term as a new rally point, which worked to inflate the correlation of this variable with popularity since at the beginning of 26Mueller, "Presidential Popularity," 21.
27Mueller, "Presidential Popularity," 22. 28The three newspapers examined were the Atlanta Constitution, the Chicago Tribune, and the San Francisco Chronicle.
his term the president enjoys widespread public approval.29
In order to avoid confusing the effects of international events from the early term "halo," Mueller's coding procedure for this variable has been altered in two ways. First, we shall assume that rally events have a decreasing impact on popularity over a five-month period only. After that period their effect is assumed to be nil and the rally variable is scored zero.30 Second, the rally point designated at the beginning of each term has been dropped and only international events are used. The new rally variable takes on a value of zero until the first event occurs. Certainly something is happening to popularity at the outset of the president's term which needs to be tapped, but to include it as part of the rally variable only prevents us from appreciating the effects of international affairs on the president's popularity.
In Table 4 we can examine the effects of each of these reforms of the rally variable on its correlation with popularity. Except for some reduction in the correlation for Presidents Kennedy and Nixon, limiting rally events to five months (column 2) has little substantive impact on the relationships. (Note that the change from a negative to positive sign from column 1 to 2 in Table 4 is wholly an artifact of the scoring procedure.) When the inauguration rally points are eliminated (see column 3), the relationships are radically altered. For Johnson, and to a lesser degree for Truman and Eisenhower, the correlations contradict the hypothesis. These negative correlations may mean that the rally events had a net negative impact on these presidents' popularity. Or it may simply be that they occurred more often during periods of relatively low popularity. Only for Kennedy and Nixon do these zeroorder correlations suggest the benign effects of international events on the president's popularity. Although a final judgment must await examination of the relationships under appropriate controls, it may well be that not all "specific, dramatic, and sharply focused" international developments benefit the incumbent president. In order to measure the early administration surge in popularity, we have created a separate Early Term variable which begins with a value of 6 and declines one unit per month, becoming 0 as the president begins his second six months in office. In Table 4 (column 4) this modestly conceived variable accounts for a prominent share of the variance in popularity.31
Presidents begin office as ambiguous stimulus objects. Experimental and field research in social psychology strongly suggests that ambiguity fosters positivity.32 As the president becomes better known, citizens form judgments on the basis of more specific and contextual information. This argument fails, however, to explain why the same pattern reemerges for the second term as well. The public presumably now has ample information on which to base opinions.
Another explanation which comes via a different body of experimental research in social psychology is that the surge of approval at the outset of the term represents a "bandwagon" or, as some have preferred, a "fait accompli" effect. In a well-known study of student responses to the 1952 election, I. H. Paul concluded that "people's impressions of the personalities of presidential candidates 31The index is crude in that it picks up whatever is occurring to the president's popularity during the first six months. It ignores the possibility that some "early term" periods will last longer than others. For example, the surge in support at the outset of the second term may be of shorter duration than for the first. The coefficient for Early Term will represent an "average" effect for these two periods, perhaps being too weak for the first and too strong for the second. 
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When time is emphasized as the primary explanatory variable, other substantive variables are crudely defined to avoid the problem of multicollinearity. It is especially inappropriate to conclude from the failure of these intentionally crude operational definitions that the real-world forces are unimportant. Such a procedure is about the only way the Vietnam War, for example, could fail to be a primary determinant of Johnson's prestige. The third problem is inadequate measurement. Although including time in the equations will reduce the strength of the estimates for such variables as the economy and war, with proper measurement significant relationships may still have resulted. We have seen that when reasonably measured, the real world does in fact shape public evaluations of the country's most prominent political leader.
Back to the Old Conventional Wisdom
The President helps people make sense of politics. Congress is a tangle of committees, the bureaucracy is a maze of agencies. The President is one man trying to do a job-a picture much more understandable to the mass of people who find themselves in the same boat. Furthermore, he is the top man. He ought to know what is going on and set it right. So when the economy goes sour, or war drags on, or domestic violence erupts, the President is available to take the blame. Then when things go right, it seems the President must have had a hand in it.36
The traditional view of close observers of the presidency described in the above passage is supported by the simple bivariate relationships reported in the preceding section. Having rejected Mueller's and Stimson's novel theories of popularity for conceptual and methodological reasons, we return to a more realistic, if somewhat less glamorous, view of presidential popularity. The model we shall examine in this article contains two propositions (or hypotheses) which to a varying degree are founded on intuitive or common-sense ideas about how the president's popularity behaves. Proposition 1. Short-term fluctuations in the president's popularity will be largely determined by contemporary events and conditions. Unlike the "coalition-of-minorities" theory, it is not so much presidential decision making to which the public responds as it is the results of those decisions. Outcomes in the form of 36James D. Barber, Presidential Character (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1972), p. 5. current events and conditions are more visible, easier to grasp, and can be more readily appreciated by the citizen in their impact on personal welfare and values. By examining outcomes such as increased war casualties or the price of food, the citizen obtains better information at a lower cost. Increasingly expensive gasoline can be more easily discerned and evaluated than can a presidential decision to veto a price ceiling on the production of "old" domestic crude oil. The evidence presented above suggests that changing economic conditions, war, international crises, and scandal are the types of outcomes which the public examines in forming evaluations of the president's performance.
Although judging the president according to one's satisfaction with current conditions may reduce information costs, this judgment will sometimes be misdirected. The president frequently does not have sufficient control over events to produce favorable outcomes to problems for which he is likely to be held responsible. Even so, such a criterion creates an important functional benefit for the political system. The president's realization of his assigned responsibility should prompt the system's most powerful actor to engage in problem solving. The president needs to know that there is little advantage in ignoring problems even when they originate elsewhere. Proposition 2. The president's current popularity reflects the level of approval during the preceding month. This proposition suggests that the president's popularity will respond sluggishly to environmental forces. During the brief intervals between observations, many citizens will maintain their assessment of the president's performance regardless of intervening events. The built-in inertia of popularity is revealed by the fact that the best information available for predicting an individual's future evaluation of the president is his or her current evaluation. This continuity will be reflected in marginal shifts in the aggregate opinion as well. Perhaps this explains why Stimson fails to find that any of the Watergate disclosures or incidents had a noticeable impact on Nixon's popularity. Where one might expect to discover a sudden bump or dip in the trend reflecting a new disclosure, such as indictment or conviction of Watergate participants, or perhaps a presidential denial of alleged involvement, Stimson finds only a continuation of a smooth and sharp downward trend.37 37Stimson, 30-33.
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In statistical parlance such a relationship is described as autoregressive, and it can be measured by including the previous month's popularity in the regression equations as one of the independent variables among the environmental forces. If popularity does behave autoregressively, whatever forces contributed to change in popularity in the recent past will continue to be felt through the previous month's popularity. As diagrammed below, previous environmental conditions, x at t2 and to a lesser degree at tj, will influence current popularity, Pt3, through the previous month's score, Pt2. In this way, the lag of popularity acquires the variance produced by those exogenous (environmental) variables which influenced popularity in the past.38
Xtl I Xt2 i>Xt3
Ptl i Pt2 Pt3
where X = environmental forces P = presidential popularity at 3 points in time A related problem common to all time-series analysis but more severe for autoregressive models is serial correlation of the error term. This can introduce several biases into the regression estimates. The standard errors for all the independent variables will be smaller than normal, which means that the reliability of the estimates will generally be lower than indicated. Also, the regression coefficients for the exogenous variables may be depressed while the value of the lagged popularity variable will be inflated since it taps much of the autocorrelation. A "shock" to one month's popularity score, for example, may continue to be felt over a series of subsequent observations, and although the cause of disturbance will remain unnoticed, the correlation of the lag and current popularity will be strengthened. Or variables in the analysis may be misspecified (such as the crudely measured Early Term, Rally, and Watergate variables), resulting in systematic disturbances of popularity remaining unmeasured. Either way serial correlation of the error term is a likely result.
The Durbin-Watson statistic which is the conventional technique for detecting serial correlation is inappropriate for autoregressive equations, and weaker tests such as the run of signs produced indeterminate results in a preliminary analysis of the relationships. Given the brief interval between observations and the likely susceptibility of our dependent variable to a large number of environmental forces, we shall take a conservative approach and assume that serial correlation is present. In order to correct for this I have followed a technique proposed by Malinvaud of creating an "instrumental variable" representation for the lagged popularity term.39 Essentially it requires that we substitute the estimated lag popularity score based on the exogenous variables in the equation for the actual lag score. If we are to obtain reasonable estimates, it now becomes doubly important that the model be fully specified. (For a discussion of the rationale procedures, and limitations of this approach and two alternative estimation procedures see the Appendix.)
The Findings
After an examination of a number of regression equations for each president, the specifications presented in Table 5 perform best in producing theoretically meaningful relationships and explaining overall variance in popularity. In a preliminary analysis, each of the variables in the equations were significantly related to popularity prior to the inclusion of the lagged popularity term. On the whole the relationships given in Table 5 support the old conventional wisdom. Environmental forces do contribute to short-term fluctuations in the president's popularity, and the trends generally display a large autoregressive component. Only for Eisenhower does the equation fail to explain a substantial share of fluctuation in his public support. What appears to have happened is that Eisenhower's popularity during his eight years in office was so stable that a greater share of the month-to-month fluctuation in his popularity reflects random sampling error of the surveys. There is simply little systematic variance available to be explained. After evaluating the significance of each of the exogenous variables on presidential popularity, we shall test the adequacy of these equations in explaining the downward trends measured by other scholars, and speculate on the implication of these relationships on presidential politics.
The Economy. The zero-order correlations in Table 3 gave little cause for optimism that change in unemployment would be a major determinant of the president's popularity, and these suspicions are confirmed with the multiple regression estimates. Only for Kennedy and Johnson does unemployment seem to have been a contributing factor, and even here the coefficients are neither large nor significant. A one-percent change in the unemployment rate over a six-month period altered Johnson's popularity by only .3 of one percent. Part of the problem of unemployment is that it is negatively correlated with war. As the Korean and Vietnam wars intensified, the unemployment rate declined along with the president's popularity.40 Change in consumer prices, which if anything increases during war, is more closely related to popularity. For four or five presidents, the coefficients are sizable with a one-percentage-point change in prices over six months affecting popularity from .9 of a percentage point for Eisenhower to 4.3 points for Johnson. The betas demonstrate that infla40Unfortunately for our understanding of the Truman and Johnson trends, there are too few observations prior to the start of the wars to obtain an independent estimate of unemployment. tion explains a sizeable share of variance in popularity.
Although interpretation must be tentative since the relationships generally fail to satisfy conventional significance requirements, the pattern is consistent with our image of these historical periods. With the Korean war present throughout Truman's second term, it seems unlikely that unemployment would constitute a significant political issue. Similarly for Eisenhower, with the exception of the 1957-58 recession, unemployment and inflation do not appear to have been highly salient public concerns. The weak relationships here may also reflect Eisenhower's apolitical image. He may have simply been held less responsible than other presidents for conditions in the political environment. At the outset of the Kennedy administration, rising unemployment, not the modest rate of inflation, was the nation's primary concern. The 1961 tax cut was designed to stimulate consumer demand and production, not reduce it. Conversely, during Nixon's tenure, at least into the spring of 1974, the primary economic issue was rampant inflation dramatically manifested initially with the meat "boycott" in 1973 and later with the escalation in fuel prices. Not surprisingly, consumer prices emerge as the important economic variable. While the relationships presented in Table S Table 5 clearly favors the two propositions describing the model. The president does not simply become less popular. Instead, fluctuations in his prestige can be located in observable events and conditions present in the political environment. Peace and prosperity, just as President Ford noted at the opening of this article, are the foundations of a popular president. Moreover, popularity responds sluggishly to environmental forces, which is to be expected, given that we are examining brief changes of an index representing the opinions of a large, heterogeneous citizenry. Like budgeting, presidential popularity is experiential and incremental.
These findings agree with our image of the modern presidency. The increased function and size of the national government, the gravity of international affairs, and the president's access to the public guarantee his prominence in national policy making. While most observers focus on the president's expanded authority and capacity for leadership, the evidence presented here reveals that with authority comes responsibility. The Full Employment Act of 1946 may have acknowledged overall governmental responsibility for managing the economy, but public opinion makes the president personally responsible. The buck does indeed stop at the White House. These data also reveal that for brief but important periods the public suspends critical judgment and gives the president its support. At the outset of the president's term and during international crises, his prestige surges offering him in the first instance an opportunity to establish successful relationships with other elites and in the second the necessary flexibility to respond to international exigencies. Sensing that the public is holding him responsible, the president is encouraged to engage in active problem solving. His decisions on policy do not affect his popularity so much as their results. Counter to the "coalition of minorities" explanation, the theory presented here argues that presidential inaction on occasion may be more costly in public support than action. No president wishes to have to deal with an energy crisis, but since it will not simply go away, he must deal with it. He knows that the consequences of public disapproval can be severe. A president's effectiveness in bargaining with other elites will be impaired, his capacity to lead public opinion will be reduced, and his party's fortunes at the polls will suffer.46 The fact that these monthly job performance evaluations are rooted in real events and conditions-and not just in time-should in the long run enhance the quality of presidential performance.
Appendix. Statistical Procedures for Correcting for Serial Correlation
Instrumental variables is a procedure similar to two-stage least squares in which the "systematic" aspect of the variance in the lagged popularity variable is separated from the auto- Table A .2 each of the equations has been reestimated, correcting for potential serial correlation.
The main difference between these estimates and those provided in Table 5 is that the lagged popularity value for Eisenhower is almost wholly eliminated and the overall explanatory power of this equation reduced to 11 percent. The estimates for the other equations suffer as well but to a lesser degree.
Tables 5, A. 1, and A.2 offer three alternative estimation procedures for testing the model. At each successive stage technical corrections become more complex and the estimates less interpretable. Malinvaud's sober conclusion of these procedures is appropriate here: "This examination of the various possible methods for treating autoregressive models with serially correlated errors leads to rather a pessimistic conclusion. When the available series are short, none of the proposed methods allows precise estimation of the serial correlation of the errors. In these conditions, direct least squares fitting certainly gives the best estimates of the coefficients. But the distribution of the estimated coefficients cannot be determined very well. So the tests and confidence intervals are necessarily very approximate."49 47Hibbs, "Problems of Statistical Estimation." 48Hibbs.
49MaIinvaud, p. 569.
